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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. J. Lil\fB, dba Lil\IB REALTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VS. 
FEDERATED.MILK PHODUCERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., FEDERAT-
ED DAIRY FARMS, INC., and 
KENNETH T. ALLRED, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 
11543 
Brief of Defendants-Respondents 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The case below was disposed of upon the making 
of Motions by both parties for Summary Judgment by 
the entry of a Judgment in favor of Defendants-Re-
spondents granting their Motion for Summary J udg-
ment and denying the Plaintiff's motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Plaintiff appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents, hereinafter referred to 
as the respondent, seeks to have the Summary J udg-
ment sustained. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent agrees in general with the state-
ment of facts set forth by the Plaintiff-Appellant, here-
inafter referred to as Appellant, but disagrees with 
several statements which appear to be argument or at 
least stated in less than a true factual manner. The 
statement that the Appellant " ... (b) began to nego-
tiate with ... Sears ... " (Appellant's brief, page 2) 
is perhaps a key question in this action and is not an 
admitted fact. Likewise the question of oral recision 
of Appellant's letter of authority is not precisely as set 
forth by Appellant on page 3 of his brief. Therefore, 
a short statement of fact will be set forth here with 
appropriate citations to the record and the depositions. 
Some time prior to October 25, 1963, John Wil-
liamson, a real estate salesman employed by Limb 
Realty, the Plaintiff herein, contacted Federated Dairy 
Farms, Inc., one of the defendants, by means of a call 
upon Kenneth T. Allred, an employee of Federated. 
The purpose of this meeting was to see if the property 
at 723 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, owned 
by Federated was for sale. This meeting probably took 
place approximately the 14th of October, 1963 ('Vil-
liamson deposition, P. 4L 9-13). 
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After some preliminary discussions, .Mr. Allred 
delivered to .l\lr. \Villiamson a letter dated October 
25, 1963, which is attached to the complaint as .Exhibit 
''A'', (R-2) which provided an authorization for )lr. 
'Villiamson to negotiate with clients for the purchase 
of the property at 723 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and specifically listed, among other parties, 
Sears, Roebuck and Company as being one with whom 
.OMr. Williamson had authority to deal. 
After receiving the letter, l\lr. \Villiamson and his 
broker, the Appellant Limb, claim to have set up a meet-
ing with some representatives of Sears, Roebuck and 
Company. This meeting was held during the first half 
of November, 1963, (Limb deposition P. 19 L. 28-30). 
At the termination of that meeting, it was concluded 
that there wasn't any interest on behalf of Sears, Roe-
buck and Company (Limb deposition P. 18 L. 6-9). 
After that initial meeting, .l\lr. Limb on perhaps 
one occasion in December of 1963, stopped in briefly 
to talk with one of the representatives of Sears, Roe-
buck and Company and again was told that he didn't 
think Sears was interested in the property (Limb depo-
position P. 20 L. 3-15), and had another contact with 
Sears, again a brief conversation when he stopped into 
the store, after the first of the year of 1964 (Limb 
deposition P. 20 L. 23). There was possibly one addi-
tional conversation in which Mr. Limb discussed the 
mater with somebody from Sears, and that was in April 
or .l\lay of 1964 (Limb deposition P. 23 L. 30; P. 24 
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L. 1-3). Except for the first meeting at which it is 
alleged a presentation was made, and which was approxi-
mately 45 minutes to one hour in length, the other 
meetings were approximately four or five minutes long 
and totalled approximate!):' three or four contacts at 
most (Limb deposition P. 24, L. 16-24) and after April 
or May of 1964 Limb had no further contact with any-
body from Sears, Roebuck in regard to the purchase 
of the subject property (Limb deposition P. 24 L. 
25-38) and Williamson had no further contact with 
anybody from Sears in regard to the purchase of the 
property after January 1, 1964 (\Villiamson deposi-
tion, P. 21 L. 26-29). (On page 21 at Line 11, the ques-
tion was "So it would be before the first of the year, 
before 1965 ?", which was an error in that the date 
should have been before "1964.") 
Thus, insofar as \Villiamson was concerned, there 
was no contact with Sears by him in an attempt to sell 
the property after the end of the year 1963 and there 
was no contact by Limb after April or May of 1964. 
On April 27, 1964, letters of termination of any 
authority granted John \Villiamson under the letter 
sued on in the case at bar as well as letters of termi-
nation to several other people who had been given 
identical limited authority in relation to selling the 
property to other prospective clients were sent at the 
direction of Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., (R-38). 
The wrong address was used for the one sent to Mr. 
\Villiamson, according to 'Villirunson's affidavit on 
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file herein and his deposition; however, it is undisputed 
that an attempt at formal termination had been made 
and according to the affidavit of D. Howe .Moffat 
( H-38), had it been known that any further claim 
was being made by \Villiamson or A. J. Limb, addi-
tional action would have been taken to terminate \\Til-
liamson's authority or the ultimate sale finally entered 
into would not have been made. 
In addition, a phone call was made by Mr. Allred, 
the Respondent's employee who had signed the letter 
which the appellant relies upon to l\Ir. \Villiamson, 
the Appellant's admitted agent and the person to whom 
the letter of October 25, 1963, was addressed advising 
him that a letter of recision was being mailed and if 
he had any prospects he should let Allred know before 
the property was listed with \\T allace-McConoughy. 
(Allred deposition P. 16 L. 25-30, P. 17 L. 1-2). 
\Villiamson's reply to this was that there was no further 
interest and to go ahead and list the property-that 
he was through with it. (Allred deposition P. 17 L. 
3-4, an dL. 29-30, P. 18 L. 1-3) \Villiamson does not 
deny this phone call but does state he can't recall it 
and, therefore, doesn't believe it was made. (\Villiam-
son deposition P. 28 L. 22-30, P. 29, L. 1-20) 
The property was listed .May 22, 1964, with \Val-
lace-1\'lcConaughy and in May of 1964 a large sign 
approximately IO' x 12' was painted on the fence imme-
diately to the south of the gate facing State Street. 
This sign was approximately directly across the street 
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from the existing Sears, Roebuck building. The sign 
held the property out for sale and had the name of 
the realtors, 'V allace-.McConaughy, in large conspicu-
ous letter as the realtors to contact. (R-31) 
The property was sold in April of 1966, through 
'Vallace-1\ilcConaughy and a full commission was paid 
upon said sale. It was thereafter that Williamson and 
Limb pressed their claim for a commission based upon 
the letter of October 25, 1963. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
The Respondents were entitled to Summary J udg-
ment and the same should be sustained by this court 
on the grounds that the letter of October 25, 1963, was 
(a) terminated by operation of law; and (b) without 
consideration. 
POINT II 
The Appellant is estopped to recover a commission 
upon at least three grounds. 
POINT III 
The relief requested by the Appellant cannot be 
granted because all of the defenses of Respondents 
have not been ruled upon. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RESPONDENTS \\'EHE 
ENTITLED TO SUl\IMARY JUDGMEXT 
AND THE SAl\IE SHOULD llE SUSTAINED 
llY THIS COURT ON THE GROUNDS TH.AT 
THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 25, 1963, "r AS 
(a) TER.MINATED BY OPERATION OF 
LA,V; AND (b) 'VITHOUT CONSIDERA-
TION. 
A. The lett.er of October 25, 1963, was terminated 
by law. 
The letter upon which the action is based and 
which is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A" 
( R-2) does not provide for any expiration nor for any 
period of time in which it will remain valid. The rule of 
law is as set forth in 12 Am. Jur., 2d, Brokers, Section 
54 at P. 813, where it states as follows: 
"'Vhere the contract is silent as to its dura-
tion, the rule generally followed, with some 
authority to the contrary, is that the broker is 
deemed to be given only a reasonable time within 
which to accomplish the object of his agency." 
Although Am. J ur. states that what is a reasonable 
time is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of 
each case, and is ordinarily a question of fact, it further 
states this is not true if the evidence is susceptible of 
only one reasonable inference in that respect. To the 
same effect, see 25 ALR at 1555, where it is stated 
that what is a reasonable time is a question of law 
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at least where the facts are not in dispute and some 
cases hold it is a question of law regardless of a dispute 
of fact, citing Coquyt vs. Shower, 68 Colo. 89, 189, 
Pac. 606. 
In the instant case, there is no dispute that there 
transpired 30 months from the date of the letter of 
October 25, 1963, to the date of the sale by others, and 
that there transpired at least 23 months from the time 
that either 'Villiamson or Limb had any contact what-
soever with Sears, Roebuck in regard to the purchase 
of the property until it was sold by others. 
In Appellant's second point, it is contended, if the 
discussion is analyzed, that it would make no difference 
how long a period of time elapsed from the time that 
the Plaintiff last made any effort to sell the property 
until the time it was actually sold, and that regardless 
of the time being one year or 100 years, he would be 
entitled to a commission even though he had in effect 
abandoned the contract. It is submitted that the cases 
herein clearly support the fact that an agreement with-
out date terminates in a reasonable length of time and 
to hold otherwise would clearly do violence to the or-
derly conducting of business. 
It is submitted that under the undisputed facts 
contained herein and the law as cited above, the Appel-
lant had more than reasonable time in which to sell 
the property; in fact, did not do so, and the letter of 
authority had terminated by operation of law. 
8 
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Il. The letter of October :25, 1963, is without con-
sideration. 
The letter of October 25, 1963, was a unilateral 
off er to pay a commission upon sale of property an<l 
was not supported by consideration. The consideration 
for such an agreement is the procuring by the broker 
of a ready, willing and able buyer which, Ly admission 
of the facts in the instant case, did not occur through 
the efforts of the Appellant or his employee, \Villiam-
son. 
See Flinders vs. Hunt.er, 60 Utah 314, 208 Pac. 
526, 28 ALR 886 ( 1922). In this case, a document 
was delivered by the seller to the broker which promised 
a five per cent sales commission if the property was 
sold, and as in the case at bar, there was no termination 
date upon the agreement. The language regarding con-
sideration was as follows: 
"For and in consideration of $1.00, the receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged, I hereby ap-
paint Fred Flinders Company exclusive agent 
to make sale of the property above described 
,, 
Upon a trial the Court found that in fact the 
agreement was not supported by consideration and that 
the Defendant had a right to terminate the agreement 
at any time because the agreement was not supported 
by consideration and did not bind the Defendant. 
On appeal, this court supported this proposition 
and quoted as follows from Mecham on Agency, First 
Ed. Sec. 207, as follows: 
9 
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"Thus, where one is given authority to sell 
the lands or other property of another and is 
to have a certain commission or share out of 
the proceeds for making the sale, the authority 
may be revoked at the will of the principal even 
though in terms it was declared to be exclusive 
or irrevocable ... The interest in the commis-
sions to be earned and in the moneys expended 
in endeavoring to carry out the agency is not 
sufficient to prevent revocation." 
In the case at bar, the writing given to 'Villiamson 
does not recite any consideration running from 'Villiam-
son to Respondent as does the agreement in the Flinders 
case and there is no allegation of consideration con-
tained in Appellant's complaint. 
In Flinders vs. Hunter, supra, this Court quotes 
with favor as follows: 
"In a note following the decision in Paschall 
vs. Gilliss, Ann. Cas. 1913E, at page 788, the 
writer of the note, under the subject 'N egotia-
tions with Broker Terminated,' states his con-
clusions from the decision thus: "Although the 
broker may be the means of first bringing the 
parties together and of opening negotiations with 
them, yet if the negotiations are unproductive 
and the parties in good faith withdraw therefrom 
and abandon the proposed purchase and sale, 
a subsequent renewal of negotiations followed 
by a sale at a less price does not entitle the broker 
to the commissions, as he cannot be said to be 
the procuring cause of the sale". 
''In view, however, that the Court further 
found that the plaintiff was not the procuring 
10 
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case of the sale in question and that it 'l:t'<M 
effectuated solely throuyh the efforts of the de-
fendant, plaintiff' is in 1w event entitled to re-
cm·er a com mission. 'Po that effect are all t}1e 
mdlwrities." (emphasis added). 
That the Appellant was not the procuring cause, 
or in fact had any effect whatsoever in the case at bar, 
see the Affidavit of :Michael B. Kauffman. l\Ir. Kauff-
man, at the time of the purchase was manager of the 
Salt Lake City Sear' s store, says as follows in the un-
disputed Affidavit which must be taken as true: 
" ... that during said period of time (that ne· 
gotiations with \Vallace-:\lcConaughy were be-
ing conducted) he personally conducted said ne-
gotiations; that he has never had any contact 
with A. J. Limb or John \Villiamson in relation 
to said purchase and at the time of negotiating 
for the purchase of said property, he was not 
aware of any prior contact made by either A. J. 
Limb or John 'Villiamson with Sears-Roebuck 
and Company and any such contact which said 
parties may have had had no effect upon the 
negotiations for the purchase of the property 
in April, 1966, and in no way effected or influ-
enced the said negotiations which ultimately 
lead to the purchase of the property by Sears-
Roebuck and Company." (R34-35). 
It, therefore, becomes apparent in the case at bar 
by the uncontroverted facts found in the pleadings and 
the depositions that (I) the Appellant never presented 
to Federated any buyer ready, willing and able to 
purchase the property (Limb deposition P. 42L. 25-
30) and as noted above, there was no attempt on the 
11 
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part of the Appellant or any of his employees to sell 
the property to Sears after, at latest, l\1ay of 1964, 
which was only the last of approximately three contacts 
where inquiry was made as to whether there was any 
interest, which contacts were very short conversations 
of only four or five minutes each. There was only one 
attempt, according to the Appellant and his salesman 
where the property was ever specifically mentioned as 
being for sale and that was in November of 1963 and 
there were, in fact, no actual sales efforts thereafter. 
In that meeting, the only one upon which the Appel-
lant relies, according to the affidavit of l\lr. Johnson, 
the subject property was only one of several that were 
mentioned and the Appellant was told at that time that 
Sears-Roebuck and Company was not interested in the 
purchase of the property. As a matter of fact, said affi-
davit states in part as follows: 
"The only discussion had concerning the prop-
erty located at 725 (723) South State Street 
was that Mr. Limb stated that he had a listing 
on said property. In response to this statement 
it was stated that Sears-Roebuck and Company 
was not interested in the purchase of the prop-
erty as it was located across the street from 
Sears-Roebuck and Company location." ( empha-
sis added) ( R-81 ) 
The Appellant fails specifically to note that the 
agreement uses the word '''negotiate" as follows: "This 
is to authorize you to negotiate with clients for the pur-
chase of 732 South State Street ... " The word is again 
12 
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used in paragraph 3 where it states as follows: '' ... 
You are only authorized to negotiate with the following 
persons ... " Now, it may be a play on words, but 
there has not been a single claim by the Appellant that 
they ever negotiated for the purchase of the property. 
\Vebster's 'l".hird New International Dictionary 
Unabridged ( 1961) defines the word negotiate in the 
sense that it would apply to the matter at bar as fol-
lows: 
''to communicate or confer with another so as 
to arrive at the settlement of some matter; meet 
with another so as to arrive through discussion 
at some kind of agreement or compromise about 
something; come to terms esp. in state matters 
by meetings and discussions . . . ; to carry on 
business or trade ... ; to deal with (some matter 
or affair that requires ability for its successful 
handling); MANAGE, HANDLE, CON-
DUCT ... ; to arrange for or bring about 
through conference and discussion; work out or 
arrive at or settle upon by meetings and agree-
ments and compromises . . . ; to encounter and 
dispose of (as a problem, challenge) with com-
pleteness and satisfaction; tackle unsuccessfully 
... ; COMPLETE, ACCOMPLISH." 
It becomes apparent even from the depositions of 
the Appellant and Mr. Williamson that there were 
never any "negotiations" and according to Mr. John-
son' s Affidavit (R-81) the most that can be said that 
was ever done in relation to Sears-Roebuck was a meet-
ing at which Limb told the representatives of Sears-
Roebuck that he had the subject property as well as 
13 
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other properties listed for sale, at which time he was 
told that Sears was not interested in the property. The 
sole claim made by Appellant is that a meeting was 
held with Mr. Johnson and .l\ir. Jenkins at Sears-
Roebuck at which the property was mentioned. There 
was not even a claim that this was the only property 
mentioned but only a claim that this property was, in 
fact, mentioned. 
In reading the contract which must be construed 
as a whole, it would appear that the contract clearly 
contemplates that at the very least, some actual nego-
tiations regarding the purchase of the property must 
be undertaken and by the depositions of the Appellant 
Limb and his agent Williamson, it is clear that at no 
time did Sears-Roebuck ever evidence an interest in 
the property nor were there any negotiations for the 
purchase of the property in the sense that the parties 
attempted to put a sale together. 
As the term "negotiation" is defined in both com· 
mon usage and by Webster's Dictionary as set forth 
above, it becomes very clear that "negotiation" involves 
communication and conference in an attempt to arrive 
at some kind of an agreement, compromise or to bring 
something about. There is no claim by the Appellant 
that the terms of any proposed purchase were discussed 
such as price, the date of occupancy, the method by 
which the purchase price was to be paid, the details 
of the ground including whether any rights of way or 
easements were connected with it, whether there was 
14 
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any outstan<ling obligation against it, or any other 
of the myriad details that are ordinarily and necessarily 
discussed when a person is "negotiating" for the sale 
or purchase of real property. 
Under the circumstances, it is respectfully urged 
that the letter of October 25, 1963, was without con-
sideration and in addition thereto, the Appellant not 
only not having been the actual procuring cause of thG 
sale or havonig had any effect on the sale to the ultimate 
purchaser, but also not having negotiated for th~ 
sale, he is not entitled to any commission. 
POINT II. THE APPELLANTS IS ESTOP. 
PED TO RECOVER A COMMISSION UPON 
AT LEAST THREE GROUNDS. 
On May 2, 1964, after the Appellant had ceased 
any further activities in an attempt to sell the property, 
a listing of the subject property was made with 'Val-
lace-.McConaughy, a real estate sales organization in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. On May 14, 1964, a large sign 
approximately 10' x 12' located on the fence to the 
south of the gate facing State Street and across State 
Street from Sears, Roebuck was painted showing the 
dimensions of the property, holding it out for sale and 
it contained the name of ''W allace-McConaughy" in 
large conspicuous letters as the realtor offering the 
property. (R-31-32) 
The Appellant admits in his deposition (Limb depo-
sition, P. 30 L. 2) that he saw that sign and although 
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he cannot recall the exact date, he thinks it was in the 
end of 1964 and he further admits that he saw the name 
"W allace-McConaughy ., on the sign as being the listing 
agent (Limb deposition P. 30 L. 10-12), and it is 
further admitted by Mr. Limb that he saw the sign 
after he had his last contact with Sears, Roebuck (Limb 
deposition P. 30 L. 21-25). Mr. \Villiamson, Limb's 
employee, also admits having seen the sign and that 
it had the name "Wallace-.McConaughy" as the real tor 
or broker on it (Williamson deposition P. 31 L. 14-
18). Mr. Williamson also indicates that he discussed 
this matter with Mr. Limb at the time that he first 
became aware of the fact that the property was listed 
with another broker (Williamson deposition P. 30 L. 
24-30; and P. 31 L. 1-13) and yet neither the Appellant 
nor his employee, after having become aware of the 
fact the property was being held out for sale by other 
parties and discussing the matter, made any contact 
with Federated, the seller, Wallace-McConaughy, the 
realtor involved, or Sears, Roebuck and Company 
(Limb deposition P. 31 L. 3; Williamson deposition 
P. 37 L. 13-30; P. 38 L. 1-13). Mr. Williamson even 
admits that in his reading the sign with Wallace-Mc-
Conaughy' s name on it ,it would ordinarily have lead 
him to believe if Wallace McConaughy sold the prop-
erty a commission would be paid to Wallace McCon-
aughy (Williamson deposition P. 38 L. 25-28). 
In September of 1965 demolition of the building 
on the property was started at the direction of Fede-
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rated Dairy Farms, Inc., and demolition was completed 
in November of 1965 ( R-33) . Both Limb and \V illiam-
son admit in their depositions that they observed the 
demolition of the building ( \Villiamson deposition P. 
32 L. 15-18; Limb deposition P. 31 L. 12-18) and 
both parties admit that they again made no inquiry 
of anyone from Federated in regard to the demolition 
of the building and as to whether or not it would change 
any of the provisions of sale or whether it had in fact 
been sold (Limb deposition P. 32 L. 9-12; L. 18-20; 
Williamson deposition P. 33 L. 10-21). 
It is admitted by \V"illiamson, the agent of the 
Appellant, Limb, that the fact that the building was 
taken off the property would have some effect upon 
the value of the property either increasing or decreasing 
the value, depending upon the desire of the purchasers 
(\Villiamson deposition P. 33 L. 27-30; and in par-
ticular lines 20-22) and yet it is admitted as noted 
above that no inquiry was made by either Williamson 
or Limb of anybody, even though they had seen the 
sign on the property holding it out for sale by another 
broker, had discussed the matter between themselves, 
(\Villiamson even had told Allred the property would 
be easier to sell if the building were removed). (Wil-
liamson deposition P. 33 L. 3-6) and had seen the 
demolition of the building on the property. This in spite 
of the fact that it is admitted that in the ordinary 
course of events the realtor who lists the property 
would be expected to receive a commission and that 
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the demolition on the property would change its value 
in one way or another to any prospective purchaser 
and would make it easier to sell the property according 
to 'Villiamson. In other words, with a sign on the 
property from l\lay of 1964 until the sale of the property 
in April, 1966, a period of 23 months, and with the 
building having been removed from the property by 
the end of November of 1965, a period of five months 
prior to the sale, still the Appellant and his agent made 
no contact with Federated in particular, or anybody 
for that matter, to note that they still claimed some 
interest in the sale of the property. 
Under the circumstances, it is respectfully urged 
that the Appellant is estopped from claiming any com-
m1ss1on. In 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, 
Section 35 (p. 640), estoppel in its broadest sense is 
set forth as follows: 
"Broadly speaking, the essential elements of 
an equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, as re-
lated to the party to be estopped, are: ( 1) con-
duct which amounts to a false representation 
or concealment of material facts, or, at least, 
which is calculated to convey the impression that 
the facts are otherwise, than, and inconsistent 
with, those which the party subsequently attempts 
to assert; ( 2) the intention, or at least the ex-
pectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon 
by, or influence, the other party or other persons; 
and ( 3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of 
the real facts. And, broadly speaking, as related 
to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential 
elements are ( 1) lack of knowledge and of the 
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means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts 
in question; ( 2) reliance, in good faith, upon the 
conduct or statements of the party to be estop-
pe<l; aud ( 3) action or inaction based thereon 
of such a character as to change the position or 
status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his 
injury, detriment, or prejudice ... 
"Equitable estoppel arises from the conduct 
of a party, using the word 'conduct' in its broad-
est meaning as including his spoken words, his 
positive acts, and his silence when there is a duty 
to speak ,and proceeds on the consideration that 
the author of a misfortune shall not himself 
escape the consequences and cast the burden on 
another. Accordingly, it holds a person to a 
representation made or a position assumed where 
otherwise inequitable consequences would result 
to another who, having the right to do so, under 
all the circumstances of the case, has in good 
faith relied thereon and been misled, to his in-
. " JUry. 
28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 53 p. 
665) , discusses estoppel by silence or inaction and says 
as follows: 
"The authorities make it abundantly clear that 
an estoppel may arise under certain circum-
stances from silence or inaction as well as from 
words or actions. Estoppel by silence or inaction 
is often referred to as estoppel by 'standing by,' 
and that phrase in this connection has almost 
lost its primary significance of actual presence 
or participation in the transaction and generally 
covers any silence where there are knowledge 
and a duty to make a disclosure. The principle 
underlying such estoppels is embodied in the 
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maxim 'one who is silent when he ought to speak 
will not be heard to speak when he ought to be 
silent.' Silence, when there is a duty to speak, 
is deemed equivalent to concealment .. Moreover, 
there are cases where the mere silence of the 
estopped party and his failure to assert the right 
later claimed will be construed as a representa-
tion that he do(IS not have the right which he 
later attempts to assert .... 
"In general, a person is required to speak only 
when common honesty and fair dealing demands 
that he do so, and in order that a party may be 
estopped by silence, there must be on his part 
an intent to mislead, or at least a willingness that 
others should be deceived, together with knowl-
edge or reason to suppose that someone is rely-
ing on such silence or inaction and in conse-
quence thereof is acting or is about to act as he 
would not act otherwise." 
The following discussion in 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estop-
pel and Waiver, Section 58 (p. 675) sets forth an 
estoppel by delay, which perhaps is closely related to 
the question discussed in the first point of this brief 
to-wit: the failure to perform within a reasonable length 
of time and says as follows: 
"Estoppel by delay is closely related to, and 
perhaps should be included in, estoppel by silence 
or inaction. It is also closely related to estoppel 
by acquiescence, since delay in the assertion of 
rights or in the raising of objections is often an 
indication of acquiescence. 
"Although a slight delay is less likely than 
a more extended one to be considered a ground 
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of estoppel, the questions whether a delay is 
such as to give rise to an estoppel can never be 
determined merely by measuring the length of 
the delay in days or months or years, since what 
would be inexcusable delay in one case might 
not be inconsistent with diligence in another. In 
other words, while delay may, when associated 
with other essential conditions, be an element 
in, or a basis for, estoppel, as indicating an inten-
tion to abandon rights or a negligent failure to 
assert them, there is no necessary estoppel aris-
ing from the mere lapse of time alone. 
"As long as parties are in the same condition, 
it matters little whether one presses a right 
promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; 
but when, knowing his rights, he takes no step 
to enforce them until the condition of the other 
party has, in good faith, become so changed that 
he cannot be restored to his farmer state, if the 
right is then enforced, delay becomes inequitable 
and operates as an estoppel against the assertion 
of the right. 
And 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec-
tion 61 (p. 683) in discussing estoppel by negligence 
where there is no requirement or intention on the part 
of the person to be estopped states as follows: 
''Negligence, generally. The statement has 
been made that the doctrine of estoppel is usually 
applied to cases where the party sought to be 
estopped was guilty of some negligence or lack 
of diligence, under the principle that if he is 
guilty thereof he must take the consequences 
of his own acts which mislead others to act to 
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their injury. Although an intention to influence 
the conduct of another is ordinarily essential 
to the creation of an equitable estoppel, it has 
been held in many cases that estoppel may arise, 
even in the absence of any intention of this 
character, from the culpable negligence of one 
party by which another has been mislead. Thus, 
an equitable estoppel may arise when one through 
culpable negligence induces another to believe 
certain facts to exist, and such other rightfully 
relies and acts on such belief." 
In relation to the last quote from Am. J ur., Wil-
liamson, whois the admitted agent of the Appellant, 
admits at P. 41 L. 10-13 of his deposition that he not 
only didn't contact },ederated but that perhaps he 
should have as follows: 
Q. \Vhy didn't you contact Federated or Mr. 
Allred and advise him of your feelings in 
regard to this matter?" (relating to the list-
ing with \Vallace-McConaughy) 
A. I can't answer that. I would have to stay that 
perhaps this should have been done but it 
wasn't." (emphasis added) 
A leading case in Utah on Estoppel is Kelly vs. 
Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P2d 731, 129 ALR 164 
( 1938), where it is said in regard to estoppel as follows: 
"It is elementary that as a matter of pleading 
an estoppel in pais exists only when facts are 
alleged which show that one person has by his 
words, deeds, or conduct so behaved that another 
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person in good faith relying upon such conduct 
has been intentionally led thereby to change his 
position for the worse and who would not so have 
changed his position except for the conduct of 
the other party. 
"This estoppel ar~ses when one by his acts, 
representations, or admissions, or by his silence 
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or 
through cupable negligence induces another to 
believe certain facts to exist and such other right-
fully relies and acts on such belief, so that he 
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted 
to deny the existence of such facts. It consists 
in holding for the truth a representation acted 
upon, when the person who made it, or his privies, 
seek to deny its truth, and to deprive the party 
who has acted upon it of the benefit obtained. 
21 Corpus Juris, P. lll3, lll4, lll5. 
Essential Elements - a. In General. 
"In order to constitute this kind of estoppel 
there must exist a false representation or con-
cealment of material facts; it must have been 
made with knowledge, actual or constructive, 
of the facts; the party to whom it was made 
must have been without knowledge or the means 
of knowledge of the real facts; it must have been 
made with the intention that it should be acted 
upon; and the party to whom it was made must 
have relied on or acted upon it to his prejudice. 
To constitute an 'estoppel in pais' there must 
concur an admission, statement, or act incon-
sistent with the claim afterward asserted, action 
by the other party thereon and injury to such 
other party. There can be no estoppel if either 
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of these elements are wanting. They are each of 
equal importance. 21 Corpus Juris, pp. II9, 
ll20. See also, Pomeroy' s Equity Jurisprudence 
(4th Ed.) p. IU44; lligelow on Estoppel (6th 
Ed.) pp. 603 ,604." 
"It is essenial therefore that the representa-
tion, whether it arises by words, acts or conduct, 
must have been of a material fact; that it must 
have been willfully intended to lead the party 
setting up the estoppel to act upon it or that 
there must have been reasonable grounds and 
cause to think that because thereof he would 
change his position to do some act or take some 
course on faith in the conduct, and that such 
action results to his detriment if the person 
sought to be estopped may now repudiate the 
words or interpretation placed upon such con-
duct. This does not require an actual intent to 
defraud but only that the circumstances and 
conduct were such as would perpetrate a fraud 
or unfair advantage if the party could now deny 
what he had induced or suffered another to be-
lieve and act upon." 
Although there are a number of Utah cases relating 
to estoppel, none have been found which are speci-
fically in point regarding estoppel in brokerage cases. 
However, that the doctrine of estoppel is recognized 
in Utah is borne out by the case of Tanner vs. Provo 
Reservoir Company, 99 Utah 158, 103 P 2d 134 
( 1940) , where the question of estoppel was raised by 
the Defendant against the Plaintiff where the Plaintiff 
had consulted and advised the Defendant in a prior 
suit regarding the adjudication of water rights, but 
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had not revealed that he himself held a claim that related 
to that prior suit. The Court held that the Plaintiff 
was estopped and said as follows: 
"Plaintiff is estopped to challenge the decree, 
not only because he is bound by reason of his 
Dixon holdings, but because he failed to disclose 
his claims when defendant was relying upon him 
and paying him compensation to do so." 
Estoppel is also recognized as being applicable in 
Utah in Farmers and Merchants Bank vs. Universal 
C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P 2d 
1045 ( 1955), where the Court, quoting an Eighth Cir-
cuit case, said as follows in regard to equitable estoppel: 
''Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the 
notion that, when one person makes representa-
tions to another which warrant the latter in 
acting in a given way, the one making such rep-
resentations will not be permitted to change his 
position when such change would bring about 
inequitable consequences to the other person, 
who relied on the representations and acted there-
on in good faith * * * " 
It should be noted that in this case there was not 
estoppel based upon silence or inaction, but estoppel 
based upon an affirmative action which is not entirely 
the case at bar, but the case is cited for the purpose 
of showing that equitable estoppel is a well-accepted 
doctrine in Utah. 
Another case which is somewhat analagous is 
Migliaccio vs. Davis, 232 P2d 195, 120 Utah l (1951), 
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wherein the Court set forth a quotation from 19 Am. 
Jur., P 364, which is in substance the same as the quo-
tation set forth above from 28 Am. Jnr. 2d in regard 
to equitable estoppel and further noted at p. 199 that 
where the person estopped carried on a course of silence 
where he should have spoken which was calculated to 
and did mislead the other party, that he was estopped 
nmv to make a claim based upon the facts that he knew 
at that time but did not disclose. 
That inaction or silence may amount to both a mis-
representation and concealment upon which to base 
estoppel is recognized in Utah Stat.e Building Com-
1ni.itsion 'l's. Great American Indemnity Company, 140 
P2d 763, 105 Utah 11 ( 1943) where the Court said 
as follows: 
"It is true as stated by our court in the case 
of Hilton vs. Sloan et al., 37 Utah 359 at page 
373, 108 P. 689, at page 694. 'It is almost un-
necessary to add that mere inaction or silence 
may, under peculiar circumstances, amount to 
both misrepresentation and concealment', which 
may amount to an estoppel. This doctrine is 
referred to and approved in the later case of 
Tan~1er vs. Pro,·o Reservoir Company et al., 76 
Utah 335, 298 P. 151. 
"It is generaJly held that in order for silence 
to work an estoppel, there must be a legal duty 
to speak, or there must be something willful 
or culpable in the silence which allows another 
to place himself in an unfavorable position by 
reason thereof. See Eltinge vs. Santos, 171 Cal. 
278, 152 P. 915, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1143." 
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That there was a duty to speak seems almost beyond 
argument. For well over 23 months and perhaps for 
as long as 25 or 26 months, the Appellant and his agent 
\Villiamson, had no contact with Sears, Roebuck and 
made no attempt to sell the property. For a period of 
in excess of 23 months, a sign was on the property 
holding it out for sale by others, and for at least 16 
months of that period, if perhaps not the full period, 
both \Villiamson and Appellant knew of the sign and 
the contents thereof where another broker was listed 
and yet neither did anything in relation to contacting 
what they would have you believe was their most active 
prospect as a purchaser, Sears, nor the seller, Fede-
rated, nor the new broker, \¥ allace-McConaughy. There 
is no claim in the pleadings or the record that any of 
the transactions and negotiations for the ultimate sale 
which was made through \Vallace-McConaughy, were 
ever conducted or carried on by the Appellant, or his 
agent, \Villiamson, and yet during all that period of 
time they remained silent, laying back, expecting that 
they then could raise a claim for a commission that 
they in fact had not earned. They had a positive duty 
not only in the sense of good business practices as well 
as good moral practices, but if, in fact, they were at 
that time still agents of Federated for the purpose of 
selling the property, they owed to Federated the highest 
duty to speak as is said in 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers, 
Section 84 (p. 837): 
"A broker is a fiduciary and holds a position 
of trust and confidence. He is required to exer-
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cise ti<lelity and good faith toward his principal 
in all matters within the scope of his employment 
... he cannot put himself in a position antago-
nistic to his principal' s interest, by fraudulent 
conduct, acting adversely to his client's interest, 
or hy failing to communicate information he ma,IJ 
possess or acquire which is or may be material 
to his emplo,IJcr's advantage, or otherwise." (em-
phasis added) . 
An<l it is the general rule that where a broker fails 
to live up to the requirements placed upon him by the 
principal-agent relationship, he is not entitled to a com-
mission if any actually be earned, and in ad<lition 
thereto, in some cases is held liable for damages. To 
this effect see Reese vs. Harper, 8 Utah 2d ll9, 329 
P ~d 410 ( 1958) where it is said as follows: 
''Because of the specialized service the real 
estate broker offers in acting as an agent for his 
client there arises a fiduciary relationship be-
tween them; it is incumbent upon him to apply 
his abilities and knowledge to the advantage of 
the man he serves; and to make full disclosure 
of all facts which his principal should know in 
transacting the business. Failure to discharge 
such duty with reasonable diligence and care pre-
cludes his recovery for the services he purports 
to be rendering." 
Appellant is on the horns of a dilemma in that if 
he now claims that he was an agent of the Respondent 
Federated at the time that he knew the property was 
being held for sale by others and saw the building being 
demolished and failed to speak, then in addition to 
being es topped by his inaction, he is further preYented 
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from recovering any comnuss10n, by reason of the 
breach of his fiduciary responsibility to his principal. 
And yet, on the other hand, if he claims he did not 
have such duty at the time, he has no ground upon 
which to claim any commission, because if he was not 
an agent of Federated at the time he had no further 
right to deal with the property and thus no right to 
commission. 
In Appellant's Point III it is argued simply that 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable in 
this case because the Respondent had full knowledge 
of the facts known to the Appellant. However, the 
Appellant simply fails to see the point made. It is 
admitted by the Appellant that a formal effort to ter-
minate any rights that Appellant may have had under 
the contract was made, and this is admitted in the plead-
ings and in the Appellant's brief. But the uncontroverted 
affidavit of D. Howe .Moffat states that had he known 
that the Appellant would have claimed a commission 
upon the sale to Sears, additional action would have 
been taken to terminate any rights by 'Villiamson or 
the sale would not have been made. (R-38-39) The 
fact that was not disclosed which Williamson and Limb 
had in their knowledge was that they still contended 
that they had a commission coming if a sale to Sears 
was made. 
In view of the demolition of the building which, 
accor<ling to 'Villiamson and Limb would have changed 
the value of the property, and the huge sign placed on 
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the property holding it out for sale by another broker, 
it would appear obvious that a person claiming to be 
the agent of the owner of the property would have 
made some contact with him to determine the current 
status of the property. 
The Appellant stresses in his brief that the sign 
di<l not specifically make overtures to Sears or anyone 
else, but it would also seem obvious that the sign being 
placed on the property and holding the same out for 
sale and being directly across the street from Sears-
Uoebuck did not limit its overtures to persons other 
than Sears and as noted in the herein, the duty to speak 
on behalf of someone claiming to be an agent is much 
greater and much more compelling than the ordinary 
duty to speak in an estoppel situation. 
The Appellant in his brief simply ignores the fidu-
ciary responsibility that he must bear toward his prin-
cipal if he is to claim a commission under any kind 
of an arrangement and only argues that he is not 
estopped because the knowledge that he should have 
revealed was also within the knowledge of the respond-
ent. However, the authorities he cites do not involve 
the fiduciary relationship. The authorities that he 
relies upon in relation to his argument of the inappli-
cability of the doctrine of estoppel relates to the ordi-
nary situation of two parties dealing at arms' length 
and not a relationship based upon a fiduciary respon-
sibility caused by the principal-agent relationship. 
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As pointed out herein, the Appellant is in the 
position of: 
(I) Claiming that he was in fact the agent of the 
defendants at the time of said sale so that he can 
claim a commission, but is not entitled to the com-
mission because of his failure to carry out his fidu-
ciary responsibility in relation to disclosures that 
he should have made to the principal; or 
( 2) In the position of admitting that he was not 
an agent at that time and thus has no right to a 
commission. 
Under either set of facts it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the Respondents are entitled to Summary 
Judgment as granted below dismissing Appellant's 
complaint. 
POINT III: THE RELIEF REQUESTED 
BY THE APPELLANT CANNOT BE GRANT-
ED BECAUSE ALL OF THE DEFENSES OF 
RESPONDENT HAVE NOT BEEN RULED 
UPON. 
The Appellant, in his brief, argues that the trial 
court erred in not granting his Motion for Summary 
Judgment but fails to argue that the court also erred 
in granting the Respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. It would thus appear that the Appellant 
is simply saying that he should have Summary Judg-
ment but that it is ~II right for the Respondents to have 
Summary Judgment also. This, obviously, cannot be 
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the case and so it is presumed by Respondents that the 
Appellant, in his Point I, is really arguing that Sum-
mary .J udgme11t should have been granted for Appellant 
and that the Summary Judgment granted the Respond-
ents should be reversed. This court is in no position 
to grant the relief asked by the Appellant for the reason 
that all of the defenses of the Respondents have not 
been ruled upon. The Respondents, in their answer, 
hm·e a second affirmative defense and plead that the 
letter of October 25, 1963, upon which the Appellant 
sued is so vague as to be unenforceable. The Respond-
ents also have raised the defense of an oral recision. 
The l\lotion for Summary Judgment did not 
consider these defenses and they obviously cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal but for that very 
reason, if the court fails to sustain the judgment below, 
the only relief that can be awarded to the Appellant 
would be to remand the case for trial so that the Re-
spondents will have the opportunity of proving the 
defenses that have not been argued heretofore, as well 
as attempting to prove the other defenses which the 
court below found to be valid as a matter of law based 
upon the undisputed facts. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged that this court should sus-
tain the judgment awarded below for the following 
reasons: 
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1. There was no performance of the obligation 
to procure a ready, willing and able buyer within 
a reasonable time nor, in fact, any activity or nego-
tiation by the Appellant that had any effect at all 
upon the ultimate purchase of the property by 
Sears-Roebuck and Company and anything that 
Appellant, in fact, did was not within a reasonable 
time and the authority granted by the letter of 
October 23, 1963, and any obligation thereunder 
became terminated by the passage of time and by 
action of law : 
2. There was no consideration for the letter of 
October 25, 1963, as it was a unilateral contract 
and the consideration was to have been perform-
ance by the Appellant, which admittedly was not 
done; 
3. The Appellant is estopped on any one of at least 
three grounds from claiming any commission, to-
wit: 
A. Estoppel by silence or inaction. 
B. Estoppel by negligence. 
C. Estoppel by breach of his fiduciary rela-
tionship because of his silence or inaction. 
4. Appellant is not entitled to Summary J udg-
ment in addition to all the foregoing because of 
the fact that all of Respondents' defenses have not 
been ruled upon and a ruling on all of said de-
fenses cannot be made for the first time on appeal. 
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It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
judgment of the court below should be affirmed. 
llespectfully submited, 
MOFFAT, IVERSON and TAYLOR 
1311 \Valker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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